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In Answer to Critics: The Revised, 
Final Version of a Difficult Moral 
Question About Cooperation by 
Catholic Hospitals 
by 
Professor Germain Grisez 
The author, who serves on the Linacre Quarterly editorial advisory 
board, is on the faculty of Mount Saint Mary's College, Emmitsburg, 
MD 21727. 
In the November 1995 issue of this journal (62:4), I published an 
early draft of a moral theological treatment of a question then 
formulated: "How far may Catholic hospitals cooperate with non-
Catholic providers?" I invited readers to send criticisms and 
suggestions for improvement. Taking into account the many 
thoughtful comments I received, I greatly revised that draft before 
publishing (In The Way of the Lord Jesus, Vol. Ill, Difficult Moral 
Questions, Quincy, IL: Quincy University, 1997, pp 391-402.) the 
treatment of that question - along with forty-nine others on various 
health care issues and one hundred and fifty more on other matters. * 
Meanwhile, however, several publications on the same or 
closely related topics have included criticisms of some statements in 
the tentative draft. Most of those criticisms have been based on 
misinterpretations of my views. In part, the misinterpretations were 
due to critics' overlooking vital parts of my argument in their efforts 
to show the moral acceptability of certain sorts of cooperation I 
regard as immoral. But in part, the trouble was due to various 
defects in that early draft. 
So, I doubt it would be helpful to respond in detail to 
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published criticism of that draft. Rather, since the issues are very 
important and probably will remain so for many years, I think it will 
be more helpful simply to replace the early draft with the following 
revised, final version. 
How far may Catholic hospitals cooperate with providers of 
immoral services? 
Statement of the Question: 
As you may know, the religious institute of women to which I 
belong always has been committed to health care. We regard it as an 
apostolate that continues in our day an essential part of Jesus' own 
ministry during his earthly life. At present, our various provinces 
operate hospitals in many communities and several states. 
In times past, we carried on our work autonomously, ignoring 
most other health care providers while allowing some non-Catholics 
to work in our hospitals under conditions we set. Today, however, 
mutually agreeable cooperative relationships with those who do not 
share our faith and ethical views are becoming increasingly vital. 
There are four reasons: the increasing complexity of health care, 
which requires many forms of cooperation to meet the needs of the 
people we serve; the need to eliminate duplication in order to limit 
escalating costs; the demands of payers (the government and 
insurance companies) that we meet their conditions with respect to 
benefits and adapt to their arrangements for financing them; and the 
resistance of non-Catholics (and also of Catholics who do not agree 
with some of the Church's teachings) to the U.S. bishops' Ethical and 
Religious Directives. Given the trends of the time, our hospitals 
either will participate in various sorts of cooperative relationships or 
will become increasingly marginalized and ultimately financially 
nonviable. 
Recognizing this dilemma, our superiors have established an 
interprovincial committee, of which I am a member, to develop 
guidelines for various types of cooperative arrangements. While 
difficult to sort out and classify, these appear to fall into four broad 
groups, though with some overlap: (1) simple contractual 
arrangements with other hospitals, diagnostic facilities, individual 
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physicians, and so forth; (2) integrated delivery networks, that is, 
broad affiliations with other institutions and providers to deliver the 
complete spectrum of health care in a particular locality; (3) 
cosponsored health maintenance organizations or similar deliverers 
of health care to certain groups of insured people; and (4) 
arrangements assuming responsibility for a purchased portion of the 
practices of a group of physicians and/or other providers who, at the 
same time, will remain free to offer the same or other clientele 
services in which we feel we cannot participate. 
The recently revised Ethical and Religious Directives and the 
committee's initial discussions seem to indicate that, where the 
ethical aspects are concerned, two matters will be central. 
First, while our commitment to the health care apostolate 
requires that we do whatever is necessary under rapidly changing 
conditions to continue delivering quality services, we must find ways 
to maintain our institutions' Catholic identity even as we surrender 
some of our traditional autonomy and legal control. 
Second, though we will not sponsor any forbidden procedures 
(such as sterilizations and abortions) in our own hospitals, we 
necessarily will cooperate with those who perform them; therefore, 
we must clarify the ways in which formal cooperation might arise in 
the delivery of services under various arrangements, and try to limit 
our hospitals' involvement to material cooperation. 
Though I know you probably will not be able to say much on 
the basis of such a general description of the problems we face, I will 
be grateful for any suggestions you can offer regarding their ethical 
aspects. 
Analysis: 
The questioner seeks fuller answers to two closely related 
questions touched on briefly in the 1994 revision of the Ethical and 
Religious Directives. The first question concerns the Catholic 
identity of Catholic hospitals, and calls for a clarification of the 
concept of the health care apostolate and the likely impact on it of 
entering into and carrying on the sorts of arrangements described. 
The second question concerns formal and material cooperation. An 
adequate response must explain two things. (1) Formal cooperation 
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can occur not only in carrying on a cooperative arrangement but also, 
and even especially, in setting it up. (2) Material cooperation also 
can be wrong, and a Catholic hospital's material cooperation with the 
provision of morally unacceptable services is likely to be wrong. 
Catholic hospitals that avoid all wrongful cooperation and maintain 
their identity may not be economically viable. Therefore, Catholics 
committed to health care as an apostolate may have to look for other, 
better ways of carrying it on. I 
The reply could be along the following lines: 
As you say, I cannot provide specific moral advice in 
response to a general question. However, I will sketch out some 
considerations that I think the administrators of your hospitals should 
keep in mind as they deliberate about entering into any cooperative 
arrangement with other providers. 
First, because Catholic identity is maintained by living up to 
the moral requirements of faith and is obscured, and ultimately 
abandoned, by living as nonbelievers do, the questions about 
Catholic identity and the moral limits of cooperation are not 
separable. Clarifying the concept of the apostolate of health care and 
its roots in Jesus' ministry will help answer both questions. 
Since death is humankind's last enemy ( see 1 Cor 15:26) and 
is part of the punishment for sin ( see OS 15111788), Jesus' 
redemptive mission was to overcome not only sin but death by 
making available resurrection and everlasting life. As health perfects 
life, disease detracts from it and ends in death. Thus, Jesus raised 
the dead and cured people of diseases. Yet, though these miracles no 
doubt were motivated partly by compassion for the suffering 
individuals he helped, Jesus' principal intention in healing people 
was to provide signs and foretastes of the coming of God's kingdom. 
Had he been committed to providing health care, having the power 
to cure everyone and raise all the dead, he would have done so. This 
consideration makes it clear that simply delivering quality health 
care services, as even some nonbelievers do, does not carry on an 
essential part of Jesus' ministry. 
In commending the health care service of consecrated 
persons, John Paul II clarifies what is required if such work is to be ,a 
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genuine apostolate: 
The church looks with admiration and gratitude upon the many 
consecrated persons who, by caring for the sick and the 
suffering, contribute in a significant way to her mission. They 
carry on the ministry of mercy of Christ, who "went about doing 
good and healing all (who were oppressed by the devil)" (Acts 
10:38). In the footsteps of the Divine Samaritan, physician of 
souls and bodies, and following the example of their respective 
founders and foundresses, those consecrated persons committed 
to this ministry by the charism of their Institute should persevere 
in their witness of love towards the sick, devoting themselves to 
them with profound understanding and compassion. They 
should give a special place in their ministry to the poorest and 
most abandoned of the sick, such as the elderly, and those who 
are terminally ill, and to the victims of drug abuse and the new 
contagious diseases. Consecrated persons should encourage the 
sick themselves to offer their sufferings in Communion with 
Christ, crucified and glorified for the salvation of all. Indeed 
they should strengthen in the sick the awareness of being able to 
carry out a pastoral ministry of their own through the specific 
charism of the Cross, by means of their prayer and their 
testimony in word and deed. 
Moreover, the Church reminds consecrated men and 
women that a part of their mission is to evangelize the health 
care centers in which they work, striving to spread the light of 
Gospel values to the way of living, suffering and dying of the 
people of our day. They should endeavor to make the practice of 
medicine more human, and increase their knowledge of bioethics 
at the service of the Gospel of life. Above all, therefore, they 
should foster respect for the person and for human life from 
conception to its natural end, in full conformity with the moral 
teaching of the Church. For this purpose, they should set up 
centers of formation and cooperate closely with those ecclesial 
bodies entrusted with the pastoral ministry of health care.2 
Thus, to be an apostolate that carries on Jesus' ministry of mercy, 
Catholic hospitals must not only deliver quality health care but 
provide service to "the poorest and most abandoned of the sick", give 
religious instruction and encouragement along with health care, 
explicitly evangelize, strive to humanize medical practice, fully 
conform to the Church's moral teaching, and supply sound formation 
in that teaching. Of course, even isolated individuals' work in the 
field of health care can qualify as a lay apostolate, in the same way as 
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other morally acceptable occupations Christians might undertake, if 
carried out in a way that struggles against the evils that amict such 
work and restores it in the light of the gospel, manifests Christian 
mercy, and bears clear witness to faith (see AA 5-7; Living a 
Christian Life, 102-13). However, Catholic hospitals will have lost 
their identity unless they meet all the conditions for carrying on 
Jesus' mission of mercy. 3 
The challenge they face must not be underestimated. A 
hospital is not simply a formal, institutional structure; it is a 
community whose corporate identity and character depend on the 
people who make it up. Thus, a Catholic hospital's special apostolate 
requires that the critical mass of participants be not only practicing 
Catholics but people whose professional work is permeated by faith 
and Christian mercy. However, most religious institutes operating 
hospitals have experienced a decline in the new members, and now 
can staff only a few positions in their hospitals while filling a few 
others with Catholics who have the necessary characteristics. Hence, 
even if Catholic hospitals could retain the autonomy they formerly 
enjoyed, their ability to carry on their special apostolate, and so their 
very Catholic identity, would be in question. 
Second, those entering into cooperative arrangements should 
not take too narrow a view of the actual and potential problem areas. 
These are by no means limited to sterilization and abortion. 
Prescribing contraceptives and helping people use them normally 
involve formal cooperation with contraception, and even material 
cooperation, especially with forms of contraception whose mode of 
action sometimes is abortifacient, can be gravely wrong. Genetic 
counseling to assist deliberation about contraception, sterilization~ 
and abortion normally involves formal cooperation in those immoral 
activities. The treatment of sterility often involves formal 
cooperation in masturbation. In vitro fertilization is morally 
unacceptable in itself, and procedures such as TOT and GIFT are 
questionable.4 While treatment often can be rightly limited or 
withdrawn, either can be a method of suicide or homicide, and both 
are likely to be abused by coming attempts to ration care on the basis 
of so-called quality of life, with the result that the elderly, the 
severely retarded, and others will be unjustly discriminated against 
and many of them will be victims of homicide by nontreatment and 
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neglect. Active euthanasia also is likely to be legalized, at first by 
permitting assisted suicide, but eventually by authorizing euthanasia 
for many people, including some incapable of consent, whose lives 
others do not consider worth living. 
Third, you realize you must "try to limit" your hospitals' 
involvement in "forbidden procedures" to material cooperation, and 
say: "We will not sponsor any forbidden procedures (such as 
sterilizations and abortions) in our own hospitals. " You rightly note 
the importance of clarifying "the ways in which formal cooperation 
might arise in the delivery of services under various arrangements." 
But you also say that "our commitment to the health care apostolate 
requires that we do whatever is necessary under rapidly changing 
conditions to continue delivering quality services." This way of 
putting the matter suggests that you consider continuing to operate 
your hospitals as the essential objective and consider avoiding 
wrongdoing as an incidental, though important, concern. Firmly 
committed to continuing to deliver quality services, you will try to 
avoid formal cooperation in sterilization and abortion.5 However, 
doing God's will and entirely avoiding wrongdoing are at the heart of 
anything that can be called an apostolate. Do not regard actions such 
as sterilization and abortion merely as forbidden procedures and do 
not think of wrongful cooperation with them merely as rule breaking, 
to be avoided if possible. Recognize such acts as grave injuries to 
persons or their very destruction, and thus contrary to Christian love 
and entirely incompatible with your apostolate. 
Someone might argue that you can easily avoid formal 
cooperation if you reluctantly work with non-Catholic providers only 
insofar as you must in order to continue operating your hospitals. 
Acting under duress, it might be argued, your participation in 
necessary cooperative arrangements will not be formal cooperation, 
it will be like the submission of a woman threatened with death by a 
would-be rapist: in order to save her life, the woman obeys his orders 
to undress and assume a certain position. Plainly such a woman 
chooses only to do things morally acceptable in themselves for the 
good end of saving her life, and she neither intends sexual 
intercourse with the rapist as an end nor chooses it as a means. So, 
the argument could conclude, your hospitals need neither intend nor 
choose any forbidden procedure. They need only choose to take the 
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morally acceptable steps they must take to survive. 
True, duress can lead one to choose to carry out another's 
orders by doing things that, though not wrong in themselves, 
ordinarily would be chosen only if one wished to cooperate in a 
wrongful common action. But duress also can lead one to choose 
reluctantly to adopt an immoral way of life and cooperate in common 
actions. The desperate woman who reluctantly chooses to become a 
prostitute as a way of earning her living fonnally cooperates in 
immoral acts, though with considerably mitigated guilt. Unlike the 
rape victim, who chooses to submit passively to violence, and like 
the desperate woman who chooses prostitution, your hospitals, 
though under duress, may well come to cooperate fonnally in the 
immoral activities of other parties to the complex arrangements into 
which the hospitals are constrained to enter. 
Since sponsoring acts of mutilation and killing in your own 
hospitals plainly would be fonnal cooperation with those evils, you 
rightly reject doing so. But even without sponsoring immoral 
procedures carried out in a hospital, those responsible for the 
hospital can fonnally cooperate with such procedures. Indeed, if a 
hospital is involved in a cooperative arrangement with providers who 
do immoral procedures, its administrators can fonnally cooperate in 
those procedures even if they are done elsewhere and without using 
any of their hospital's facilities. 
Unlike people who manage a hotel, the administrators of a 
hospital ordinarily do sponsor the things done in it. Since a hospital 
exists to provide health care services, administrators ordinarily 
intend each and every procedure carried out using its facilities. Of 
course, if a hospital's administrators were blamelessly unaware of 
wrong things done in it, they would not cooperate with them, and 
they might avoid fonnally cooperating even with certain wrongful 
activities done in the hospital they knew about but neither initiated 
nor facilitated. However, administrators hardly can avoid 
cooperating fonnally with procedures such as sterilization and 
abortion done using their hospital's facilities. They must ensure that 
patients, having been adequately infonned, genuinely consent, and 
must see to it that the procedures are carried out correctly. 
Therefore, when such a procedure is done in a hospital, even if its 
administrators not only avoid sponsoring it but are very displeased 
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about its being done, they are likely to cooperate fonnally in it. 
Fonnal cooperation also can occur without a hospital's 
facilities being used when the hospital is involved in a cooperative 
arrangement with providers of sterilization, abortion, and other evils. 
Suppose that the arrangement to provide the complete spectrum of 
health care in a locality or all services for participants in a health 
maintenance organization includes some immoral activity of at least 
one of the other providers involved in this joint enterprise. In that 
case, all who share responsibility for managing the enterprise will 
fonnally cooperate in that activity insofar as they must ensure that 
patients give infonned consent and that those directly involved meet 
professional standards. Therefore, if your hospitals enter an 
arrangement with providers of any evil, they either must avoid all 
responsibility for managing the joint enterprise or entirely exclude 
from it the evils other parties provide. 
Moreover, your hospitals will be involved not just in 
delivering services after an arrangement has been made but in 
making the arrangement. 6 Moral nonns can be violated at this stage. 
Suppose, for instance, a governmental agency, insurer, or 
non-Catholic health care provider sought to create an entity to 
provide the full range of services that at least some of the prospective 
clientele and parties to the cooperative arrangement think pertain to 
health care. Suppose a Catholic hospital was a potential party to the 
prospective arrangement. The negotiators might agree that nothing 
contrary to the Ethical and Religious Directives would be done in the 
Catholic hospital or sponsored by it; they might even arrange that 
providers working in the Catholic hospital would never be called on 
to refer for excluded services or follow up on them. To ensure that 
the Catholic hospital would be able to avoid such unacceptable 
cooperation, they also would agree that one of the other parties to the 
arrangement would provide the excluded services for clients who 
wanted them. This arrangement seemingly would neatly divide 
responsibility, isolating the Catholic hospital from immoral 
activities. 
In making the arrangement, however, the Catholic 
negotiators, intending to avoid providing the immoral services in 
their hospital, would have intended that another party supply them. 
So, making the arrangement would be fonnal cooperation in the 
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other party's supplying them. Moreover, when those authorized to 
act on behalf of the Catholic hospital signed the contract, the hospital 
would be agreeing to all its provisions and intending its doing so to 
motivate the other parties to agree to the contract and do as they 
agreed. So, since one of the other contracting parties would have 
undertaken to provide immoral services, the hospital would be 
formally cooperating in that undertaking and its execution as long as 
the contract remained in force. 
Someone might object that nothing the Catholic hospital did 
would bring about anything immoral. The governmental agency, 
insurer, or non-Catholic health care provider initiating negotiations 
might well have decided beforehand that certain services, such as 
sterilization, would be provided, "either because the market 
'necessitates' this or because the government will mandate a basic 
benefits package which will require provision of all services." And, 
indeed, the immoral services would be provided even if the Catholic 
hospital did not participate - the arrangement "designed this way will 
neither increase nor decrease the number of prohibited procedures." 
Moreover, the objection will continue: "The 'moral object' of the 
Catholic provider is the provision of health care as a Gospel 
mission." So: "The moral object of creating [the entity] is precisely 
not to provide prohibited procedures." Therefore, the objection will 
conclude: "Since our intention is not to provide services we deem 
immoral, cooperation seems to be material. ,,7 
The problem with this argument is that it treats the Catholic 
hospital's intended end - providing health care as an apostolate 
without being involved in immoral procedures - as the moral object 
of its choice to participate in the arrangement. But the object of that 
choice precisely is to make an arrangement for "provision of all 
services", and in choosing to make this arrangement, each 
contracting party intends the others to make and carry out the 
undertakings required of them by the arrangement. Therefore, to 
achieve its good end the Catholic hospital chooses a bad means: to 
have the immoral procedures provided by another party to the 
arrangement. Even if no more immoral procedures are done than 
would have been done in the absence of the arrangement, the 
Catholic hospital will have intended to arrange that the immoral 
procedures be done as a necessary means to "the provision of health 
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care as a Gospel mission." 
But, it might be argued, this formal cooperation could be 
avoided. Your hospitals could refuse to agree to anything more than 
this: "We are only going to do together what all partners agree is 
appropriate and anything deemed inappropriate must be the private 
project of that proponent. ,,8 Thus, the contract would omit all 
reference to immoral activities except to make it clear that the 
Catholic provider would not provide them and that the cooperative 
arrangement in no way concerned them. The Catholic negotiators 
could require that the contract not specify that any party to it would 
provide any immoral service. They could even require that the 
contract's effectiveness not be contingent on any agreement between 
the other parties for the provision of any immoral service. 
One can imagine making agreements with provisions of that 
sort, and such agreements could be made and carried out without 
formally cooperating in another party's immoral procedures. But an 
agreement with such provisions hardly would satisfy those who 
"mandate a basic benefits package which will require provision of all 
services." To satisfy them, negotiators might work out an 
arrangement to provide all services but agree to fonnalize it in two or 
more legal documents so that the Catholic party would not be 
required to sign any contract that made reference to immoral 
procedures except in specifying that the Catholic party would not 
provide them. However, if the set of documents gave effect to the 
whole arrangement, the choices of all parties in signing any of them 
would depend on one another's undertakings in the same way as they 
would if a single contract straightforwardly implemented the 
agreement to provide all services, and the Catholic hospital would 
fonnally cooperate in providing all of them. 
In sum, entirely avoiding formal cooperation in immoral 
practices will be difficult indeed. It can arise in ways that are not 
obvious and it seems unavoidable in any arrangement that would 
satisfy a mandate to provide all services. Though I have pointed out 
some of the problems, there might well be others. 
Fourth, avoiding fonnal cooperation in wrongdoing is not 
enough. Even if it can be avoided, your hospitals will materially 
cooperate with all the services by other providers in any way 
facilitated by a cooperative arrangement. Such material cooperation 
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can be morally unacceptable for several reasons. It can occasion a 
sin of formal cooperation; it can be scandalous; materially 
cooperating with wrongdoing can impair the capacity to give 
credible witness against it; and it can be unfair to those injured by the 
wrongdoing. 
In providing health care, one who materially cooperates in 
wrongdoing often will be tempted to cooperate formally for three 
closely related reasons. Health care providers ordinarily share the 
intentions of those they serve; particular services ordinarily must be 
integrated into a comprehensive pattern of care; and the problem 
with morally excluded services very often is that a bad means is 
chosen to attain an appropriate end. For example, if a woman's or 
family's physical and/or psychological health calls for birth 
regulation and the woman refuses morally acceptable means, any 
health care provider sharing responsibility for her care will be 
tempted not only to refer her to someone who will prescribe other 
means but to try to ensure that she uses her chosen means regularly 
and effectively. Even if a Catholic hospital's policy excludes such 
formal cooperation, members of its staff and some other personnel -
some and perhaps many of whom do not accept the truth the Church 
teaches on such matters - almost certainly will be drawn into it. 
If a Catholic hospital is to carry on its work as an apostolate, 
its board members and administrators should deal with formal 
cooperation in various evils by its personnel. If those responsible 
instead studiously avoid noticing such formal cooperation or decide 
to tolerate it, they at least materially cooperate in it in a way that 
hardly can be justified. As a community committed to an apostolate, 
the hospital will have betrayed itself even if its board members and 
administrators manage to stop just short of letting its own complicity 
in evil become formal cooperation. 
Material cooperation with wrongdoing can be scandalous in 
the strict sense: It can lead people to sin by encouraging them in 
rationalization and self-deception (which do not free them of guilt) 
regarding the wrongdoing. The scandal would not be prevented by a 
Catholic institution's prohibition of morally unacceptable procedures 
within the domain remaining to it, even if that policy is well 
publicized. For, to most non-Catholics and many Catholics that 
material cooperation would seem to imply that those procedures are 
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not wrong in themselves but merely forbidden to Catholics, as eating 
meat on Friday used to be. Moreover, other things being equal, a 
Catholic institution's material cooperation is much more likely to be 
scandalous than an individual Catholic's. The institution's acts are 
presumed to be fully deliberate and free, not the product of ignorance 
or weakness, as an individual's might be. And since the institution 
claims to be distinguished from others by being Catholic, wnatever it 
does is taken by many non-Catholics and even, unsophisticated 
Catholics to be the Church's own act. 
In various ways, a Catholic institution's significant, obvious, 
voluntary cooperation in wrongdoing inevitably will impair and 
probably even negate its capacity to provide credible witness. For 
example, commingled with the service of secularized providers, its 
activities will become less identifiable and less distinctively 
Catholic. Again, the closer association with health care providers 
whose practice violates moral nonns taught by the Church often will 
make it harder for a Catholic institution's administrators and staff to 
speak out for the truth of those nonns and work against their 
violation. Its partnership in an integrated delivery network or 
cosponsorship of an HMO providing sterilization, abortion, or 
euthanasia will strongly suggest that the Catholic Church does not 
really and finnly reject these evils but only maintains an insincere 
official opposition. For those engaged in health care as an apostolate 
to impair their witness in these and other ways would be utterly self-
defeating, since, to repeat, the essence of apostolate is not only to 
promote a human good such as health but to practice Christian love 
and bear witness to the gospels' truth, including love for the tiniest 
and the most debilitated of Jesus' sisters and brothers, and the moral 
truths regarding how they are to be dealt with. 
The material cooperation itself, together with the scandal and 
impainnent of witness, will have consequences. Some individuals 
will die or suffer lesser injuries that might have been prevented if 
those who profess the sacredness of life and the dignity of persons 
consistently avoided complicity in wrongful behavior. Accepting 
these bad consequences is likely to be unfair unless the victims 
themselves freely consent to what they suffer. Like individuals, 
institutions should be prepared to make great sacrifices rather than 
allow anything they do to bring about the death of - or grave injury 
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to - an innocent person. 
Someone might argue that many health care providers who 
do not accept Catholic moral teaching are convinced that what they 
are doing is right, and if those with whom a Catholic hospital 
cooperates act out of sincere consciences, their good faith calls for 
respect that can justify otherwise excluded material cooperation. But 
Catholic hospital administrators are responsible for their own acts. 
The apparent sincerity of conscience of others - their actual 
consciences are unavailable to us - does call for respect and 
sometimes justifies toleration of objective wrongdoing. But their 
apparent good faith may even increase the temptation to cooperate 
formally with them by making such cooperation seem less 
repugnant. And if some who appear to be acting in good faith 
actually are rationalizing and deceiving themselves, cooperating with 
them can give very serious scandal by making it more difficult for 
them to acknowledge the truth and repent. Similarly, cooperating 
with others presumed to be in good faith makes it not easier but in 
some ways more difficult to bear clear witness to the truth about 
what they are doing. And even real good faith cannot reduce the 
unfairness to third parties involved in helping bring about effects 
injurious or destructive to them. 
In view of these considerations, it seems to me that limited 
material cooperation with non-Catholic providers is least likely to be 
morally excluded from the first and fourth of the types of cooperative 
arrangements you mention: specific forms of cooperation with other 
providers, and purchasing and administering the morally acceptable 
services of other providers. As for the second and third types of 
cooperative arrangements, even if a Catholic hospital can participate 
in an integrated delivery network or cooperatively operated health 
maintenance organization with others who provide immoral 
procedures while avoiding formal cooperation in them, I doubt that it 
can justifiably engage in the material cooperation that any such 
arrangement would require of it. Moreover, operating within the 
cooperative arrangement, the Catholic hospital's distinctive 
characteristics and practices would be likely to be marginalized or 
even completely suppressed, so that even if it maintained its juridical 
ties with the Church, it will no longer carry on Jesus' ministry of 
mercy and will have lost its Catholic identity. 
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Fifth, the preceding considerations make it clear that you 
cannot assume that you always will be able to enter into the 
arrangements necessary to keep a hospital financially viable while 
entirely avoiding wrongful cooperation. Therefore, you ought to be 
prepared to give up at least some - and eventually, perhaps all - of 
your hospitals. In bearing witness, individual Christians are 
expected to sacrifice even life itself when that is necessary. Should 
not your institute be ready to bear witness by giving up its hospitals 
and finding other ways of carrying on its apostolate under today's 
changing conditions? 
Many dedicated and generous women and men put their 
money and effort into building the system of Catholic hospitals 
founded and operated by your institute and others. Health care fully 
integrated with Catholic faith, moral teaching, and pastoral care 
would otherwise have been unavailable; some cities and towns 
would have lacked hospitals; and many poor people would have been 
deprived of hospital care. Without Catholic teaching hospitals, 
Catholics would not have had the opportunity to be trained as 
physicians and nurses in full harmony with their faith and in a way 
that helped many of them carry on their professional work as a true 
apostolate. 
Since Catholic hospital administrators today are, as it were, 
trustees for those who built the system, your superiors rightly wish to 
adapt to the changed situation and carry on the apostolate, if 
possible. But they would betray their trust in saving their hospitals 
by changing them in ways their founders and supporters would not 
approve. Institutions, like hospitals, are only means for carrying out 
a health care apostolate. Like other means, their usefulness is 
limited. Remaining attached to them as their usefulness diminishes 
will entail infidelity to the good they formerly served. 
Many of the benefits that flowed in the past from operating 
Catholic hospitals will no longer be realized if they are merged into 
the secularized health care system, and some of those benefits could 
be realized even without Catholic hospitals. To provide health care 
fully integrated with Catholic faith, moral teaching, and pastoral care 
surely is a noble ideal. But how likely is it to be realized by a 
Catholic hospital whose services are merged into an integrated 
delivery network or HMO cosponsored by secularized providers? 
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Catholic teaching hospitals offer a valuable opportunity for Catholics 
to be trained in full accord with their faith only if their programs are 
consistently Catholic, and if nurses and doctors completing those 
programs will be able to practice without moral compromise in the 
fields for which they trained. But where such principled practice 
remains possible, the technical training for it is likely to be available 
outside Catholic teaching hospitals, and individuals can acquire their 
indispensable moral and spiritual formation by private study and 
from faithful Catholic mentors whose concerns extend to health care. 
Finally, just as individuals maintain their Christian identity 
by constantly seeking, accepting, and faithfully fulfilling their 
personal vocations, so groups of Christians who make up 
associations maintain their identity as Christian communities only by 
fidelity to their proper missions. Fidelity precludes questioning basic 
commitments, such as the vows by which you and other members of 
your institute have consecrated your lives. But it also calls for 
periodic reconsideration of all projects undertaken to implement 
those basic commitments. Like discernment pertaining to vocation, 
this reconsideration should seek to match gifts and resources with 
the opportunities to serve others by meeting their genuine needs, not 
only for temporal goods but for spiritual ones. In carrying on such 
reconsideration, members of your institute might ask: What health 
care needs are now unmet and likely to remain unmet by others? 
And what gifts equip us for meeting some of those needs? 
Today, I believe, clearheaded and courageous reflection may 
well point toward refusing to accept a subordinate role for your 
hospitals in a secularized health care system and instead adopting 
more suitable means of serving people most in need and least served 
by the secularized system. Candidates for your service include the 
terminally ill who need appropriate care to die with true dignity 
rather than by the indignity of suicide or homicide,9 handicapped 
individuals whose quality of life falls below some arbitrarily set 
limit, unborn babies whose abortions the system would provide and 
whose mothers need help to choose an alternative, couples who need 
instruction in natural family planning, the working poor who lack 
health insurance, people too disorganized to make use of the health 
care system, the mentally ill who have been "freed" from institutions 
to wander in the streets, and other victims of selfishness and 
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ideological fashions. By serving these "poorest and most 
abandoned" and joining explicit catechesis and evangelization to that 
service, your institute could in truth continue to carry on Jesus' 
ministry of mercy. 
* In The Way of the Lord Jesus, volume three, Difficult Moral 
Questions (Quincy, IL: Qunicy University, 1997) 391-402. 
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